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Two different kinds of synchronization have been applied to cryptography: Synchronization of
chaotic maps by one common external signal and synchronization of neural networks by mutual
learning. By combining these two mechanisms, where the external signal to the chaotic maps is
synchronized by the nets, we construct a hybrid network which allows a secure generation of secret
encryption keys over a public channel. The security with respect to attacks, recently proposed by
Shamir et al, is increased by chaotic synchronization.
PACS numbers: PACS numbers: 05.45.Gg, 05.45.Vx, 87.18.Sn
Two identical dynamical systems, starting from differ-
ent initial conditions, can be synchronized by a common
external signal which is coupled to the two systems [1].
It has been shown that even chaotic systems can be syn-
chronized although the correlation between external sig-
nal and the common dynamics still remains chaotic [2].
This phenomenon has been applied to private-key cryp-
tography: If two partners A and B want to exchange a
secret message, A adds her message to a synchronized
signal while B subtracts it. Of course, A and B need a
common secret (private key), namely, the algorithm and
the parameters of their identical chaotic system.
Synchronization has recently been observed in artifi-
cial neural networks as well. Two networks which are
trained on their mutual output can synchronize to a time-
dependent state of identical synaptic weights [3]. This
phenomenon has been applied to cryptography as well
[4]. In this case, the two partners A and B do not have
to share a common secret but use their identical weights
as a secret key needed for encryption. The secret key
is generated over a public channel. An attacker E who
knows all the details of the algorithm and records any
communication transmitted through this channel finds
it difficult to synchronize with the parties, and hence to
calculate the common secret key. Synchronization by mu-
tual learning (A and B) is much faster than learning by
listening (E).
Neural cryptography is much simpler than the com-
monly used algorithms which are mainly based on num-
ber theory [5] or on quantum mechanics [6]. In fact, it
can be expressed as synchronization of an ensemble of
random walks with reflecting boundaries [7]. But the
question remains: Is it secure? Does an algorithm exist
which can decipher the secret key from the transmitted
information? For the set of parameters used in Ref. [4]
it has been shown that such algorithms do exist [8]. In
an ensemble of attackers there is a nonzero chance that
some of them will synchronize to the two partners. How-
ever, it has recently been shown that the probability of a
successful attack can be made exponentially small [9]; it
decreases like exp(−yL) where the parameter L (stands
for the depths of the weights of the networks) is defined
τ
Π
x
w
σ
f
FIG. 1: Parity machine for K = 3 with chaotic map f .
below. Hence for large values of L the computational
time is so long that an attack is infeasible, meaning that
neural cryptography remains secure. Of course, similar
to classic key-exchange protocols, one cannot prove that
there does not exist any other algorithm which cracks the
system.
In this Letter we combine neural cryptography with
chaotic synchronization. Both partners A and B use their
neural networks as input for the logistic maps which gen-
erate the output bits to be learned. By mutually learning
these bits, the two neural networks approach each other
and produce an identical signal to the chaotic maps which
– in turn – synchronize as well, therefore accelerating the
synchronization of the neural nets.
We show that the security of key generation increases
as the system approaches the critical point of chaotic
synchronization, and it is possible that the exponent y
diverges as the coupling constant between the neural nets
and the chaotic maps is tuned to be critical.
We start with the parity machine (PM) with K hid-
den units which are arranged in a tree architecture
as shown in figure 1 for K = 3. Each hidden unit
has N discrete weights wk,j which can take the values
{−L,−L+1, ...L− 1, L}. At every training step the net-
work receives an input vector consisting of KN compo-
nents xk,j ∈ {+1,−1}. Each hidden unit generates a
local field
2hk =
N∑
j=1
wkjxkj (1)
Previously, the output bit of each hidden unit was the
sign of the local field[4]. Now we combine the PM with
chaotic synchronization by feeding the local fields into
logistic maps:
sk(t+ 1) = λ(1 − β)sk(t)(1 − sk(t)) + β
2
h˜k(t) (2)
Here h˜ denotes a transformed local field which is shifted
and normalized to fit into the interval [0, 2][11]. For β = 0
one has the usual quadratic iteration which produces K
chaotic series sk(t) when the parameter λ is chosen corre-
spondingly; in this Letter we use λ = 3.95. For 0 < β < 1
the logistic maps are coupled to the fields of the hidden
units. It has been shown that such a coupling leads to
chaotic synchronization[2]: If two identical maps with
different initial conditions are coupled to a common ex-
ternal signal they synchronize when the coupling strength
is large enough, β > βc.
Now we consider key generation between two partners
A and B. Each partner uses a PM with logistic maps.
Hence each partner has a time series of KN weights
w
A/B
kj (t), K local fields h
A/B
k (t) and K signals s
A/B
k (t).
In addition, a common external sequence of random in-
puts xkj(t) is presented to both of the partners. This
sequence of inputs is public, as well as the complete ar-
chitecture and the parameters β and λ. Each partner
generates random initial weights w
A/B
kj (t = 0) which are
not public and not known to each other.
In the original version of neural cryptography [4] the
synchronization of the weights, wAkj(t) = w
B
kj(t) for t >
tsync was achieved by training, for instance, in the sim-
plest symmetric version the training step reads
wAkj(t+ 1) = w
A
kj(t)− xkj(t)τk(t) (3)
for partner A and the same for partner B and τk(t) is
defined in eq. 4. When a weight moves outside of the al-
lowed interval it is reset to the corresponding boundary
value ±L. Note that the equation above may be consid-
ered as a random walk with reflecting boundaries.
The security of synchronization is achieved by the par-
ity construction. The training step is performed only if
the output bits τA, τB of the two PMs are identical and,
in addition, if the output bit σAk of the hidden unit is
identical to τA. In the parity network one defines
τA/B(t) =
K∏
k=1
σ
A/B
k (t) (4)
The output bits (τA, τB) which are transmitted at each
training step generate control signals which produce a
mixture of attractive, repulsive and quiet movements of
the corresponding hidden units of A and B. Only the
parity construction gives a low probability of repulsive
steps compared to an attacker PM close to synchroniza-
tion [10].
In the hybrid network introduced here, we keep the
parity mechanism but we define the hidden output bits
σA,Bk by the signals s
A/B
k of the logistic maps coupled to
neural networks:
σAk (t) = sign(s
A
k (t)− s0(β)) (5)
The public parameter s0(β) is chosen such that σ takes
the values ±1 with equal probability.
Now the complete algorithm for the two partners A
and B is defined. The parameter β controls the cou-
pling strength between neural network and chaotic map.
For β = 1 we obtain the PM studied previously [4, 10].
The two networks synchronize to common time depen-
dent weights wA(t) = wB(t). The average synchroniza-
tion time tsync scales with the size of the input as lnN ,
and is therefore relatively short even for large systems.
The synchronization time also increases as L is increased,
and for L < O(
√
N) one finds that tsync increases with
L2, as expected from random walk theory [9].
For β = 0 the two chaotic signals (sAk (t), s
B
k (t)) are not
coupled and just generate random outputs σ and τ . As
a consequence, the two networks do not synchronize.
By construction, the synchronized state
sAk (t) = s
B
k (t); w
A
kj(t) = w
B
kj(t) (6)
is a fixed point of the dynamics. The question remains:
is it an attractor? In our model synchronization occurs
by two mechanisms simultaneously. The weights of the
two neural nets move towards a common sequence and
the signals of the corresponding chaotic maps move to-
wards a common chaotic sequence triggered by the local
fields of the networks. Hence it is not at all obvious
that synchronization is possible. Our numerical simula-
tions as well as our analytic[13] calculations show that
the two networks synchronize when the parameter β is
larger than its critical value. The critical value, βc, is
defined such that the average synchronization time, tav,
diverges. Figure 2 presents the average synchronization
time as a function of β for K = 1, 2 and L = 10. Re-
sult indicate that for K = 1, 2 βc ∼ 0.15, 0.35. Note
that for K = 1 βc is very close to the reported result for
the synchronization of two logistic maps using common
white signal[2], instead of gaussian signal, h, is eq. 2.
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FIG. 2: The average synchronization time as a function of
β, for L=10, N=1000, K=1 (◦) and K=2 (). Results were
averaged over 1000 samples. Synchronization here is defined
when all the weights are the same and all the K chaotic units
of the partners are equal in their first 6 digits.
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FIG. 3: Average synchronization time as a function of L for
K=2, N=10000, β=0.45 (◦ ), β=1 ( ) and the regression
power-law fit β=0.45 (dotted line) and β=1 (dashed line).
Results were averaged over 1000 samples.
Figure 2 shows that the synchronization time as a func-
tion of L does not depend much on the parameter β. The
average synchronization time, tav, is almost constant for
0.45 < β < 1, for all values of L studied.
Now we turn to the problem: Is the observed synchro-
nization secure? Consider an attacker (eavesdropper E)
who records the exchange of the bits (τA(t), τB(t)) and
who knows the sequence xk(t) as well as the parameters
of the hybrid networks. Can E calculate the common
weights before the synchronization of A and B?
The most successful attack reported by the group of
Shamir [8] is the flipping attack. We generalize this at-
tack to our hybrid network as follows. The attacker E
uses a network identical to the ones of A and B and
trains its weights only if the output bits of A and B agree.
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FIG. 4: The exponent y as a function of β-βc, where βc=0.35
(see Fig. 2). In the inset Pf lip as a function of L is plotted
for different values of β to obtain y. The results are for K=2,
N=10000 and averaged over 10000 attackers. The different
lines represent (from top to bottom) β=1, 0.85, 0.65, 0.55,
0.5, 0.45. The slopes of the fitted lines are respectively: -
0.169, -0.199, -0.286, -0.485, -0.657, -0.834.
When τE agrees with τA and τB the attacker E learns
its weights as defined before, eq. (3)[10]. However, when
τE 6= τA = τB the hidden unit with the “weakest” local
field h˜Ek is selected and the sign of its output bit σ
E
k is
changed. With this redefined hidden unit learning pro-
ceeds as usual. The weakest field is the one which has
the smallest distance to the decision boundary given by
equations (2) and (5).
Figure 4 shows the main result of this Letter. The inset
of Figure 3 indicates that the probability of a successful
attack decreases exponentially fast with the level number
L,
Pflip = A exp(−yL) (7)
But contrary to the synchronization time, this probabil-
ity has a strong dependence on the coupling strength β.
Figure 4 shows that the attacker’s success rate Pflip/y
decreases/increases as β approaches the critical value,
βc ∼ 0.35, from above. It is clear from 4 that y increases
as β approaches βc from above, and it is possible that
y diverges close to criticality. However from the current
data we cannot rule out other scenarios including the one
that y is finite at criticality and a further investigation
of this question is required.
Note that the values of β in our simulations are still far
away from the critical point. For a fixed size of the sys-
tem N and close to βc the synchronization time increases
beyond the scaling reported in Fig. 2. Hence a finite net-
work is not useful for key generation close to βc. Any-
way, the main result is that the security of the network
4strongly increases when the hidden units are screened by
chaotic synchronization. For example: The synchroniza-
tion time of a single attacker scales like L2N lnN . We
need about exp(yL) attackers on the average to be suc-
cessful. If we can use one year of a teraflop computer for
each message, we have about 1020 calculations available.
Hence, for N = 105, we need a level number of about
L ∼ 135 without chaotic synchronization, β = 1. For
β = 0.45, however, we need a value of L ∼ 25, only. It
indicates that the two partners A and B need less than
5% of training steps to synchronize in comparison to the
same system without chaotic synchronization (β = 1).
Finally, we note that the effect of the chaotic map on
a hidden unit is essentially the generation of noise. We
have replaced the chaotic map in equation (2) by ran-
domly flipping the output bit σ = sign h with some prob-
ability p measured in actual simulation. This probability,
p, is suppressed to zero as the two neural networks ap-
proach each other. For this approximation we can solve
the dynamics of synchronization analytically, by using
the methods of Ref. [10, 12]. We find good agreement
between the noise approximation and the actual simula-
tions using the chaotic maps[13].
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